present paper focuses on the second phase. One reason for this choice is that the World Bank and the IMF, in their Global Monitoring Report (2004 and 2005) make unquestioning reference to Dollar and Levin's study, which tends to give it some political credence that could well impact donor behaviour. The main message of these works on selectivity indicators is that selectivity is to be assessed from the level of income (or poverty) and the quality of policy (governance) of recipient countries. This paper argues that these analyses of selectivity indicators raise significant methodological problems, which heavily influence the assessment of aid selectivity for both bilateral and multilateral donors. It also considers as legitimate for donors to simultaneously use other selectivity criteria corresponding either to expected factors of aid effectiveness or to handicaps to development. It is notably argued that vulnerability to exogeneous shocks and low level of human capital should be considered as selectivity criteria. Taking these other criteria into account dramatically changes the assessment of donor selectivity. This is evidenced through several methods of assessment of aid selectivity.
After stating those principles which, in our opinion, should form the basis of any measurement of the aid selectivity, and thereby clarifying the limits met by the recent analyses on selectivity, we show how donor ranking can be reversed according to the criteria used to assess aid selectivity. We use successively two methods of assessment, one referred to as the elasticity approach, the other as the recipient average profile approach. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines some principles for the assessment of aid selectivity, while the next three sections investigate three different ways of measuring it: selectivity measured according to a dichotomic criterion (section 3), selectivity measured by elasticities from an aid allocation model (section 4) and selectivity measured by an average profile of recipient countries (section 5). Section 6 concludes. The analysis of selectivity can either be conceived to examine the extent to which the allocation of total aid (from all sources) approaches an optimal allocation, or look at the degree to which each source of aid conforms to the criteria of optimal allocation, which produces a ranking of donors according to the selectivity of their aid.
The selectivity of the total amount of aid, as analysed by Dollar (2001, 2002) , refers to the Millenium Development Goals of lowering poverty (taking as objective the maximum reduction of the number of poor) by 2015. Aid is expected to contribute to this goal through its effect on growth, according to an income elasticity of poverty assumed to be the same across countries. Following previous studies by Dollar (1997, 2000) , Collier and Dollar assume that the positive effect of aid on growth depends on the quality of the economic policy (measured using the indicator of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, the CPIA). They then design a linear program which enables an optimal aid allocation between the various countries to be calculated on the basis of the current level of total aid. This allocation is intended to equalise the marginal contributions of aid to reducing the number of poor per country, by taking into account three elements: (i) the decreasing marginal impact of aid on growth, (ii) the initial incidence of poverty in each country, and (iii) the quality of their current economic policy. In other words, the objective of aid allocation is to maximise the sum of output increases in all the developing countries, weighted by the percentage of poor (people with less than one dollar per day) in each country's population. As this first simulation results in allocating most of aid to India, Burnside and Dollar constrained aid allocated to India to remain at its current level. Modifying the current allocation of the total aid according to their simulation would make it possible to double the number of people moving out of poverty by 2015. This study was an invitation to the donors to collectively reform their approach to aid allocation in order to accelerate the achievement of the Millennium Development
The comparative analysis of each donor's selectivity was initiated by McGillivray (1989 McGillivray ( , 1992 , who uses the recipient countries' per capita income as the single criterion of selectivity. An additional stage was reached by Dollar and Levin (2004) and , who diversify the criteria. The indicator proposed by Roodman (more directly inspired by the work of McGillivray) differs from Dollar and Levin's in that it is not based on the econometric estimation of functions of aid allocation. Each donor's performance indicator corresponds to its aid volume adjusted to take into account the "quality" of aid, particularly its selectivity (the volume of aid is lowered according to the "bad" quality of allocation). The 2. Some Principles for the Assessment of Aid Selectivity adjustment of aid value with regard to the selectivity does not apply to emergency aid, the granting of which increases the performance of the donors whatever its destination. The aid selectivity depends both on the recipient country's per capita income and on an indicator of its governance designed by Kaufmann and Kraay 2 . The adjustments for project aid and programme support are different, because David Roodman considers, following Radelet 2004 , that project aid is more effective than programme support in countries with poor governance. The linear weights applied to the level of the per capita income and to the level of governance are multiplicative, so that the aid granted to a rich, well-governed country is equal to zero, as is the programme aid granted to a poor, badly-governed country. From the adjustment of the actual value of aid according to its quality, two indicators are provided for each donor for 2002: the value of the donor's adjusted aid in proportion to its GDP, and the rate of aid quality or aid selectivity (i.e. the ratio of the adjusted aid to the aid value before adjustment).
The analysis of the principles on which these measures of selectivity are based makes it possible to underline their main limits.
Selectivity is only one aspect of aid quality
Evaluating the selectivity of each donor's development assistance does not mean measuring its overall aid quality, but only one aspect-the quality of geographical allocation insofar as it affects aid effectiveness. The modalities of the assistance given to each country are obviously also a factor of effectiveness. Thus , in order to provide an indicator of the aid quality, adjusts its value not only according to the allocation (the selectivity by itself), but also according to its degree of tying and its fragmentation into many purposes.
Moreover, optimal allocation of aid is undoubtedly not independent of its purpose (project, programme, technical assistance, emergency), the conditionality attached, the type of financing (grants or loans), and the extent to which the aid is tied. This means that aid effectiveness does not depend only on the behaviour of the recipient countries, but also on the donors' behaviour. Whilst Roodman takes into account several modalities of assistance to assess donor selectivity (which is somewhat debatable), Dollar and Levin address the issue of selectivity independently of the modalities used, which constitutes a first limit of their measurement of selectivity.
Selectivity is related to the objectives of aid
Selectivity is basically a relative concept, as it signifies the optimal allocation of aid with regard to its effectiveness, which is necessarily contingent to its objectives, and these objectives can logically differ from one donor to another. The usual objective is economic growth. However, since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals, the aid objectives pursued by the international community have become multidimensional, even though a common target is poverty reduction. Over and above the Millennium Development Goals, foreign aid can target other objectives that should be assessed in terms of effectiveness. These may include the promotion of democracy or the respect of human rights, neither of which have a clear link with growth and poverty reduction. Aid can also be used to finance global public goods, which generate positive externalities to nonrecipient countries (e.g. control of pollution or communicable diseases), or it can finance post-conflict countries and help them to avoid the resumption of conflict and to rebuild their economies. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also show that aid promotes growth in post-conflict countries more than elsewhere. Finally, some countries, particularly France, assign specific goals to their aid policy, such as supporting former colonies or countries that share their language. These goals can be considered as legitimate insofar as they express specific solidarity or responsibility. They can also be justified with respect to the criterion of aid effectiveness to promote development. Certainly, the ties created by a colonial past or a common language, facilitate understanding between partners when aid involves a dialogue on the actions implemented and a transfer of knowledge, which is often the case.
It is difficult for analyses of aid selectivity to take into account the diversity of the donors' goals. They thus focus on poverty reduction resulting uniquely from the effect of aid on economic growth. This constitutes a second limitation of such analyses.
Some Principles for the Assessment of Aid Selectivity
Selectivity depends on various recipient country characteristics which condition aid effectiveness Recent studies on selectivity Dollar, 2001, 2002; Dollar and Levin, 2004; are based essentially on Dollar's thesis (1997, 2000) on the relationship between aid and economic growth (used as a basis for the 1998 World Bank report, Assessing Aid), and fail to take into account the academic community's extensive critical studies that followed Burnside and Dollar's whatever their specificities and preferences, it is the same kind of economic policy (defined as good) which promotes growth and increases aid effectiveness. This assumption has been strongly criticised by Kanbur (2004) , McGillivray (2004) and Michaïlof (2004) .
More important, however, is to acknowledge that aid effectiveness in terms of growth does not depend only (and perhaps not even mainly) on the recipient's economic policy.
Other factors, which have been econometrically tested, intervene. The importance of economic vulnerability, for instance, has been identified (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001 ), i.e. shocks to which many developing countries are particularly exposed, either through their foreign trade, notably because of the variations in the international prices of primary commodities, or due to climatic incidents or natural disasters.
These factors both have a negative impact on growth and increase aid effectiveness. Indeed, in the countries facing shocks, aid can avoid shortfalls in imports and the slowdown of growth, as well as the cumulative decline that often ensues.
The higher the amount of aid, the more it relatively dampens the macroeconomic impact of shocks; that is to say, aid is marginally more effective in more vulnerable countries or, in other words, aid decreases the negative impact of the vulnerability.
The analysis of the ways in which aid effectiveness is influenced by the recipient country's vulnerability and by factors other than economic policy has been developed in several directions. Studies have highlighted the specific effect of aid provided at a time of negative terms-of-trade shocks (Collier and Dehn, 2001) or in post-conflict situations (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) . Following on from their earlier studies, Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) The fact that the analyses of selectivity retain only good economic policy or good governance as a factor of aid effectiveness is thus the third limitation of these studies 5 .
Selectivity is meaningful only for discretionary aid
A difficult question is to determine which concept of aid is the most appropriate for assessing selectivity. The authors who have assessed aid selectivity have preferred to use the Official Development Assistance disbursements rather than the commitments, whereas a priori the latter represent the donors' intentions better than the disbursements (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976) , and more accurately reflect actual policy. The reason advanced for this is that, if commitments are durably higher than disbursements, this expresses a "tendency of certain donors to promise more than they can realistically deliver, or a failure to learn from history that certain recipients cannot absorb aid as fast as donors hope " (Roodman 2004, p.5) . A final question is whether development aid only should be considered, or if emergency aid should also be included (as Roodman does, unlike Dollar and Levin), since the latter should not be dissociated from development goals. However, the reasons for offering emergency aid are different from those for development aid and its allocation depends on specific, even random, events such as natural disasters or wars 7 .
In short, the current analyses of aid selectivity come up against three main limitations: the focus on a single objective for aid, the assumption that aid effectiveness with regard to economic growth depends exclusively or mainly on economic policy and institutions, and the measurement of aid which poorly reflects the discretionary choices of the donors.
In what follows, we will try to push back these limitations of the current studies on selectivity. We will show that the assessment of the various donors' aid selectivity, such as it was put forward by the Global Monitoring Report (2004) , is largely modified when we take into account the different factors affecting aid effectiveness, and to a lesser extent when we consider that donors can legitimately have other goals that maximum poverty reduction. Moreover, in order to better focus on "discretionary" aid, we use, as do Dollar and Levin, gross disbursements rather than net transfers, considering that the former better represent the choices of aid allocation. For the same reason, but unlike these authors, we deduct the disbursements corresponding to debt cancellation, and, like them, we deduct emergency assistance from ODA (the Development Aid Committee's aggregate) 8 . and the other developing countries (Guillaumont, 2004) . Levin for the two elasticities they estimated (with regard to the per capita GDP and the CPIA). In order to obtain a composite indicator of selectivity, we then simultaneously estimated the elasticities with regard to the four variables (GDP per capita, EVI, HAI, KKI) 15 .
A radically changed ranking of donors
It appears clearly that donor ranking changes dramatically from one indicator to the other in Table 1 , which gives the results for each donor and in Table 2 So that a higher index I for donor i means that, compared to the other donors, donor i allocates its aid to countries either poorer, or more vulnerable, or with a better governance, or with a lower human capital, or a combination of these four characteristics. It is thus possible to rank the donors according to this index of aid selectivity ( Table 3 ).
The ranking thus obtained is relatively close to that obtained from elasticities ( 
Taking specific donor preferences into account
We previously underlined that assessing selectivity should take into account the fact that bilateral donors may logically have preferences for certain countries, mainly due to historical or cultural ties or because they feel that they have a special responsibility with regard to post-conflict countries.
We thus consider that the former colonial powers (France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) may understandably give relatively more aid to their former colonies (in a proportion fixed arbitrarily at 20%). We alternatively consider the possibility of a preference givenin the same proportion of 20% -by donors to countries that share their language. This can be justified by the donors' strategy of defending a minority language by promoting the economic development of the countries speaking this language considered as a common public good. This leads us to identify from among the aid recipients those using the Spanish, Portuguese or French language. However, we do not consider that the United Kingdom or the United States could share the same concern of defending the use of English... Finally and again independently, we adjusted the profile of the aid recipients to take account (in the same proportion of 20%) of a possible post-conflict situation 18 .
The construction of the indicator adjusted for the preference 19 given to former colonies consisted in multiplying by 1.2 each of the four elements (w ij * GDP i ; w ij * HAI i ; w ij * EVI i ; w ij * KKI i ) when the donor i allocates aid to a receiver j which is a former colony. The same was done independently for the indicator adjusted for linguistic preference , then for the preference given to the countries in a post conflict situation, without any distinction between the donors for this latter preference (Tables 4 to 6 ). This adjustment improves the ranking of the countries likely to have specific preferences all the more since they are selective with regard to other criteria in allocating their aid to former colonies or countries sharing the same language.
Not surprisingly, the new ranking shows the former colonial powers-particularly Portugal, the United Kingdom and
France-in a better position (Table 4) . A similar increase in the ranking occurs when linguistic preference is taken into account. Thus, Portugal, which gives a priority to Portuguese-speaking countries, France, Belgium and Canada (but not Switzerland), which give some preference to French-speaking countries, and Spain have a better ranking ( Table 5 ). The adjustment carried out in Table 6 for the countries in a post-conflict situation also modifies the ranking, which mainly improves the position of Belgium, This paper has argued that there is a rationale to distinguishing global aid selectivity and donor specific selectivity and draws some conclusions for both.
First the definition of optimal allocation of total development aid, measured for all the donors, raises some problems which have not been appropriately addressed in the literature. It is still necessary for the international donor community to agree on satisfactory criteria for aid allocation.
Several different criteria will necessarily have to be used given the complex relationship between development aid and poverty reduction, as underlined by the academic Second, based on this analysis, it seems debatable to apply uniform criteria in order to assess the selectivity of the various bilateral aids, since donors legitimately have particular preferences due to specific solidarities and a comparative advantage in assistance to certain countries.
Moreover, a donor's selectivity can logically aim at compensating for different selectivity preferences of other donors. If one thus wants to compare the aid selectivity of developed countries, it may be advisable to seek a consensus on how to take into account particular but legitimate preferences of some bilateral donors, at the same time as one applies common criteria. We have outlined a way of doing this in the last section of this paper.
The scientific issue still to be addressed is the design of a model that will make it possible to determine optimal aid allocation using multiple criteria. Indeed Collier and Dollar' 
